This article explores the application of Art. 1F Refugee Convention in light of contemporary 'terrorist' concerns. With an interpretive approach that adheres strictly to the object and purpose of the Article referred to above, it advocates a revised application of International Criminal Law to the exclusion decision, while rejecting human rights-oriented or purposive approaches to the same question. This is not backward-looking or regressive, but pragmatic, recognising the systemic objectives both of the Convention and of the Article itself, and their positions in the post-Westphalian order. The best way to support refugee protection-and to exclude those undeserving of it-is to do so within the confines of the Convention itself. Departing or attempting to reform its boundaries may do more harm than good.
INTRODUCTION
Art. 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention; Convention; RC) provides for the disapplication of refugee protections to those with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering they 'have committed' or 'have been guilty of' serious crimes. It is a rarely used provision. One 2017 study noted that, in the UK, Art. 1F exclusion represented just 0.1% of initial asylum decisions and 0.2% of refusals between 2008 and 2015. 1 Nevertheless, it has seen steadily increasing deployment since the 1990s, triggered initially by the brutal conflicts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 2 and later in response to the proliferation of global terrorism. 3 Following these conflicts, refugee law's ability simultaneously to shelter the vulnerable and exclude the undeserving has been highlighted. 4 This article explores the contemporary application of Art. 1F. Part B provides an interpretive overview of the exclusion clause following the structure provided by the 1969 Vienna 10.14324/111. 2052-1871.121 former is a moral position: some acts are 'beyond the pale'; those acts are juxtaposed beside the humanitarian nature of the Convention; and, consequently, some actors do not deserve protection. 32 As stated in Pushpanathan: 'those who are responsible for the persecution which creates refugees should not enjoy the benefits of a convention designed to protect those refugees'. 33 Yet, as explored in depth in part D, the moral status of the undeserving is perceived through the lens of the host state. It is a subjective concept, beholden, or at least vulnerable, to the 'securitising' of migrationthe expansion of border restrictions on discretionary policy or security grounds. 34 In the heated terrorism paradigm, this subjectivity is problematic. The latter aim-excluding serious criminals-centralises the contemporary, post-World War II push towards international accountability. It is also pragmatic; states may not willingly submit to a regime requiring them to protect such individuals. 35 For France, the right to exclude serious criminals was 'a prime factor in determining [the nation's] attitude towards the Convention'; for the UK, it was required 'to promote maximum adherence to the Convention'. 36 More broadly, however, these dual aims point towards the systemic objectives of the exclusion clause, where the humanitarian goals of refugee protection are balanced with the need to protect its essential integrity. In its presumption that granting refugee status to serious criminals presents a risk to the viability and integrity of refugee law, 37 the exclusion clause is a pragmatic recognition of the need to 'maintain the credibility of the protection system'. 38 It is significant, for example, that the Convention does not disbar wider humanitarian protection following exclusion.
It does, however, forbid that any such protection is granted under the Convention. 39 With this compulsory denial of Convention protection, Art. 1F looks beyond the interests of individual 32 UNHCR 'Guidelines' (n 31)s.2; Kaushal and Dauvergne (n 3) 86; James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (CUP 1991) 214. 33 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. 34 David Cantor, Joris Van Wijk, Sarah Singer, and Maarten Bolhuis, 'The Emperor's New Clothing: National Responses to "Undesirable and Unreturnable" Aliens Under Asylum and Immigration Law' (2017) 36(1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 1-3. 35 Hathaway and Foster (n 5) 525. 36 For France, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24 (Jul. 17, 1951) ; for UK, (UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 29 (Jul. 19, 1951) , at 15. 37 Hathaway and Foster (n 5) 525-6. 38 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D, C-57/09 and C-101/09 [2010] ECR I-10979 ('B and D'). 39 ibid [116] , [119] : the EU's incorporation of 1F 'does not preclude a person from applying for 'another kind of protection' outside the scope of the Directive. That other kind of protection which Member States have discretion to grant must not, however, be confused with refugee status'. 10 . 14324/111.2052-1871.121 states, acting instead to uphold the unity and viability of refugee law as a whole. 40 It is to be applied '"scrupulously" to protect the integrity of the institution of asylum'. 41
Interpretive Principles
From the above analysis, four salient principles can be drawn. First, good faith calls for the contemporary, effective application of the Convention while upholding the human rights values it espouses. It prohibits interpretations that depart the clear meaning of its terms. Acknowledging good faith as a limitation can also illustrate the need to avoid divergence among states, promoting unified interpretation. A living instrument approach that aligns, where possible, with developments in ICL and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is therefore supported. Second, the context of Art. 1F as an exception to a human rights treaty mandates a narrow interpretation of its terms.
Third, state practice is relevant, but is best deployed in a contextual role. The potential for state practice to diminish protections must always be borne in mind. Fourth, and most importantly, the twin aims of the exclusion clause-denying assistance to the undeserving and ensuring serious criminals face justice-play an integral role in preserving the viability of the refugee system. This is the core purpose of Art. 1F, so the clause must only be applied to those whose admittance would threaten that system. The following part begins the substantive assessment of exclusion in practice.
These principles guide the remainder of this article.
COMPLICITY IN A TERRORIST AGE
The exclusion clause utilises international law in 1F(a) and (c) both to define the crimes it deems excludable and determine whether the applicant 'has committed' or 'has been guilty' of those crimes. Doing so, it tethers itself to internationally agreed standards and allows for evolutive interpretations of the most egregious crimes. 42 As discussed earlier, it is essential to remain in step with these laws. 43 This part analyses the determination of that liability and considers that in terrorist contexts. Sub-section 1 explores ICL liability under 1F(a), raising two essential critiques about its application in exclusion law. Both critiques concern exclusion's failure adequately to consider refugees' mitigating factors. Sub-section 2 examines the problems and presumptions raised when an individual is a member of a notoriously violent-perhaps 'terrorist'-group. Membership is 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 problematic and has caused fragmentation, but it also raises questions of voluntariness -questions which go to the heart of the critiques raised by both Bond and Ogg. Sub-section 3 considers liability under the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations (1F(c)). It notes that the international instruments used to define 'terrorism' in this context have simultaneously broadened the term and confused its implementation in 1F(c) assessments. An international standard is suggested to remedy this. Concluding part C, it is argued that 'terrorism' is a Western, moral imposition onto Art. 1F. It simplifies exclusion; but that simplicity benefits neither claimants nor the clause itself.
Liability Under ICL
For Rikhof, 1F(a)'s heavy reliance on ICL has been consistent and useful when defining its crimes. 44 Thus, documents such as the Rome Statute, the statutes establishing the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R), and the jurisprudence of international courts have been utilised with clarity when interpreting the meaning of international crimes. 45 Despite the gravity of 1F(a)'s crimes, however, it is rare for exclusion to concern 'big fish' criminals. That is more often the work of international criminal tribunals. 46 To the contrary, the many thousands that undergo Refugee Status Determination every year are more likely to be implicated in crimes than to be the primary perpetrators. They are thus more likely to be found culpable under broader principles such as complicity, or to be those to whom defences might reasonably apply. Yet, while ICL has been useful for defining crimes, the same cannot be said for 'the complete transformation of the principles of international criminal law in the area of extended liability'. 47 This section considers two critiques that chime with this assertion.
a) Problem 1: Incomplete transpositions of ICL
Bond's primary concern is the failure to translate criminal law's mitigation stage into the exclusion assessment. 48 Criminal proceedings have a foundational principle that the allocation of a penalty to a criminal (the sanction stage) only occurs after a preliminary determination of guilt (the culpability stage). Thus, courts can divide proceedings: guilt is determined in the culpability stage, 44 sentence. Indeed, suggests Bond, it is the sentencing stage that so often dwells on the most ambiguous 'grey areas' of individual circumstance. Yet exclusion only includes the culpability stage, and so is blind to these ambiguities. 49 This is a point echoed by other writers. Holvoet notes that the 'quasi-criminal' exclusion decision can, at times, be more serious than the criminal conviction. Yet the latter is the only one that can be tempered at sentencing stage. 50 Hathaway raises the argument for a 'third step' before exclusion is finalised. This recognises that prosecutorial discretion and sentencing flexibility allow ICL both to decide who to prosecute and then to mitigate findings of guilt in compelling circumstances. No such discretion or flexibility exists in exclusion. Because 1F(a) tethers itself to ICL, it may follow that one who would benefit from that discretion in a criminal assessment ought to benefit comparably from exclusion. 51
The structural discrepancies between International Refugee Law (IRL) and ICL go further, however. Though ICL has generally crystallised around high-level actors, it has also recognised a hierarchy of participation applying to low-level actors or accomplices. 52 This hierarchy carries material weight at sentencing stage, where research shows supporting actors consistently receiving lesser sentences than primary ones. 53 In exclusion, however, most commonly concerning low-level actors, that hierarchy is absent: with no sentencing, the refugee cannot benefit from a reduced punishment. 54 They are excluded, regardless. This is well illustrated through aiding and abetting, an extended liability principle, and duress, a defence. Aiding and abetting has been recognised by the ICTY as a 'lower form of liability' where the 'form and degree of participation' must be considered at sentencing. 55 Duress is more controversial in ICL, but even the dissenting judges in Erdemovicwhere the majority recognised duressagreed that it should be considered as mitigation while sentencing. 56 Thus, although disagreement remains over the relevance of these issues in culpability, their role in sentencing is widely recognised. 57 on culpability frameworks, cannot consider these factors. For Bond, this ineptitude undermines the equity of Art. 1F, particularly given the morally, factually and legally complex environments -Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Syriafrom which contemporary refugees flee. 58 These concerns are particularly prescient in the context of modern 'terrorist' groups.
b) Problem 2: ICL's Innate Inadequacies
Ogg also recognises exclusion's failures in extended liability and defences, but suggests the fault lies in the substance of ICL, not in its transposition onto exclusion law. Comparing UK jurisprudence, which has regular recourse to ICL, with that of the United States of America (US), which does not, Ogg argues that both approaches mask the coercions and pressures that drive women to commit excludable crimes. They provide fragmented assessments of the circumstances surrounding exclusion decisions and struggle to determine whether the refugee possessed a 'moral choice' in their actions. 59 The US operates a strict liability persecutor bar, 60 the failings of which can be illustrated through Asfaw v Gonzales. 61 After two weeks of brutal torture, Asfaw, an 18year-old girl, agreed to transcribe the statements of the political prisoners her captors were detaining. In exchange, her torture would stop. In the US, she was excluded at first instance; her assistance met the threshold of the persecutor bar. Her appeal also failed; with a strict liability persecutor bar, she had no framework under which to argue that her experience and fear of torture impacted on her culpability. 62 Yet, while it may be argued that ICL principles such as duress could provide such a framework, two cases from the UK-SK (Zimbabwe) 63 and MT (Zimbabwe) 64undermine that. In both cases, mens rea, duress and criminal responsibility proved too narrow to provide a holistic assessment of the applicant's circumstances. 65 SK was excluded under 1F(a). As a widowed member of the Zimbabwean youth militia, she was physically and sexually abused. She wanted to leave, but deserters were beaten or killed. With the militia, she was forced to attend two farm invasions against her will and fearful of the repercussions. Her involvement amounted to crimes against humanity. 66 MT was a female police officer in Zimbabwe when she was instructed, 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 against her will, to harass opposition party members. In one interrogation, she slapped a detained member of the opposition. She had avoided this duty numerous times, but when her party suspected her, she participated. Failure to do so could have meant imprisonment and torture for herself. 67 She was deemed complicit in crimes against humanity.
SK's mens rea was established according to Art. 30 Rome Statute: she meant to engage in the farm invasions, in full knowledge of the crime. 68 Yet, for Ogg, this simplistic assessment reveals the truncating effect this mens rea standard has on an applicant's evidence. In contravention of UNHCR's call for a 'full assessment of the individual circumstances,' 69 the focus is narrowly confined to the acts themselves without regard for the applicant's broader motivations or fears. Neither the sexual violence, gendered power dynamics of the militia, nor even SK's (in)ability to disengage could be considered. The analysis was confined to the farm invasions, 'as is the commonplace in the criminal law'. 70 For Ogg, this distinction between motivation and intent, and its blindness to wider context when considering voluntariness, exemplifies the dangers in relying purely on criminal principles in exclusion assessments. 71 MT's culpability was as an aider and abettor: she was deemed to have materially contributed, knowing her acts were assisting the principal's crime. 72 Again, however, the restricted lens of criminal law shines through. MT knew her police force were prone to beating the opposition in custody. But it was precisely that knowledge that made her fear she would suffer the same treatment if she objected. ICL, for Ogg, is (and was) insensitive to that nuance. 73 With neither applicant satisfying the imminence requirement of 31(d) Rome Statute, duress was rejected in both cases. They could not demonstrate 'a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm'. 74 For Ogg, however, the strictness of these tests leads to 'neglect [of] the gendered power imbalances between the coerced and coercer'. 75 Not necessarily an imminent threat, analysis increasingly suggests that women committing war crimes or crimes against humanity do so in the shadow of sustained 67 MT (n 64) ss.8-21. 68 such as the UNHCR may advocate for the inclusion of duress in exclusion (using the same imminence test as the Rome Statute), 77 the framework provided by ICL is itself inadequate.
Though this temporal requirement is entrenched in the Rome Statute, it is essential, argues Bond, that its application is guided by a more contextualised assessment, including, for example, the individual's ability to escape. 78 An examination of the membership problem considers these issues further. 
Membership and Voluntariness
The membership question addresses whether and to what extent complicity in excludable crimes can be inferred from an individual's membership of a group committing those crimes. It is relevant because, as discussed, most potentially excludable refugees come under the extended liability principles it centres on. Thus, a number of the concerns raised above apply. The UNHCR position is that membership alone must not be sufficient to establish liability. This has been supported by the CJEU 79 and by courts in the UK, Germany and Belgium. 80 Indeed, in the seminal JS (Sri Lanka) case, the key question was 'what more than membership of an organisation is required to meet the responsibility threshold in 1F(a)?' 81 Yet, while membership alone is insufficient to establish liability, a position has developed whereby voluntary membership in a notoriously violent group can give rise to a rebuttable presumption of knowing participation or of acquiescence in the crimes, and thus personal responsibility. This is the stance advocated by the UNHCR and followed by courts in Holland and Canada. 82 In the UK, this presumption was initially confirmed by Gurung, but later rejected by JS: the nature of the group should be just one of seven factors assessed. 83 At the crux of the presumption is imputed knowledge into the mind of the refugee. Yet it has been suggested, in these instances, that 'it is not the nature of the claimant's crimes which leads to exclusion, but the nature of the crimes alleged against the organization'. 84 If correct, this is problematic. Not only inverting the presumption of innocence, it shades into guilt by association, a position Zambelli argues has already been reached in Canada. 85 Yet its main inadequacies may appear in relation not just to 'violent' groups, but to 'terrorist' ones. As Kaushal and Dauvergne found in their extensive Canadian study covering 1998 to 2008, the tendency to impute knowledge based on group membership was increasing. This was attributed to the rising prominence of 'terrorism' in exclusion discourse and judicial reasoning, and to the influence of 'post-2001 security politics'. 86 Where guilt is established through imputed knowledge of a 'terrorist' group's violence, two problems stand out: first, the potential to gloss over the dualistic civil and violent 79 second, the fact that it is precisely in relation to violent groups that factors mitigating voluntariness are most likely to be prominent. Both, however, are interrelated.
Kaushal and Dauvergne's study notes that numerous cases conflated the violent and nonviolent branches of organisations: 'supporting "good deeds" within a terrorist organisation is providing support to the terrorists'. 87 One case recognised Hamas both as a social/religious organisation and as a violent one, noting also that the social wing took 95% of Hamas' overall budget. Yet, the applicant's actions-attending lectures and recruiting Palestinian youths-and his shared goal of liberating Palestine made him complicit in a 'terrorist' organisation. Hamas ought to have garnered closer scrutiny. 88 deserving refugee would not join voluntarily, would have neither knowledge nor sympathy for the organisation's purposes, and would dissociate at the earliest opportunity. Thus, the refugee that, faced with a crisis of conscience, rejects the group at the earliest opportunity is exalted the ideal applicant. Yet the irony is that such a refugee-in Canada at least-could no longer exist: either because their involvement in the group would implicate them at first instance, or because the knowledge imputed to them by virtue of the group's notorious violence would be such as to establish the requisite mens rea. 92 And this says nothing for those who do not get the luxury of a crisis of conscience: those whose life and that of their family may depend on them serving in this group, even if in a mundane way; or those (perhaps women) who live under the kind of sustained sexual coercion that must abrogate any real choice. Refugees are not required to be 'morally pure or criminally blameless'. 93 Nor, for that matter, can they be 'amoral robots'. 94 Yet the complexity of exclusion lies in the complexity of the refugee's morality. Or at least it ought to. As long as the exclusion clause remains the site of a public diatribe over terrorism, however, and as long as terrorism remains over-utilised as 'another pathway into the character of the refugee', 95 that complexity will be glossed over in favour of simplicity and legalistic presumptions. For anyone convinced that 'terrorists' are ritually abusing the refugee process, this is unproblematic. But under a Convention that protects the vulnerability of the refugee, and given the statistics the clearly delink terrorist and refugee flows, the imposition of rhetorically loaded terminology such as this should raise alarms. have consistently broadened definitions of 'terrorism' and made it harder for applicants to claim asylum. 96 Exploring this, a few instruments are worth considering. First, setting a worrying trend, a UNGA Declaration in 1997 explicitly connected refugees and terrorism. States were called to take 'appropriate measures…before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts'. 97 Following that, the UNSC followed suit.
Liability Under Principles and Purposes of UN
UNSC Resolution 1373, passed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, outlined that terrorism was contrary to UN Principles and that it was for states to ensure that 'refugee status is not abused by [its] perpetrators, organizers or facilitators'. 98 Lastly, UNSC Resolution 1624, quoting Art. 1F, called upon states to deny 'safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of [terrorist acts.]' 99 There has thus emerged a connection in the highest institutions of the international order between terrorism and asylum, despite no evidence-at the time or today-that refugees have ever been the perpetrators of these crimes. 100 For Juss, these documents reveal the battery of international initiatives applicants for refugee status now face as they seek asylum. They indicate international law's developing slant. Their invocation in exclusion is a misguided weapon in a state's counter-insurgency weaponry. 101 Yet, without actually defining terrorism, the dangers these instruments articulate are unspecified and merely potential. They give states free reign to revisit exclusion law and fuel the perception that 'asylum is somehow a terrorist's refuge'. 102 It is thus worth considering how courts have utilised these instruments to develop an understanding of terrorism in exclusion. Shortly following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005, the first statutory definition of terrorism 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 one true interpretation of a treaty'. 112 Singer therefore suggests that the international approach taken in Al-Sirri is correct. Yet, an international approach should necessitate an international definition of terrorism. Applying domestic or regional definitions could splinter the meaning of Art. 1F(c). 113 But attempts at an international definition of terrorism have so far failed: the ICC could not reach agreement, and even if it could it would not be universally binding; a customary law definition avoids this dilemma, but one proposed by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 2011 was heavily criticised. 114 Absent this definition, recourse to international standards will remain inherently limited. The solution Singer suggests is a guiding principle: that the activity in question 'attacks the very basis of the international community's coexistence'. 115 Until an internationally binding definition is agreed upon, upholding this international standard does justice to the high threshold required by 1F. 116 Amid concerns that exclusion is proliferating under the terrorism paradigm, it limits the broad and imprecise Art. 1F(c) to the gravest cases, and to those where Art. 1F(a) and (b)-both of which provide more concrete exclusion parameters-do not apply. 117 Thus, it retains 1F(c) as an 'exclusion of last resort'. 118
Western Priorities and the Unworthy
This part first outlined the establishment of liability under 1F(a) in reference to ICL. The shortfall of ICL in extended liability was illustrated by two critiques: Bond criticised the incomplete transpositions of ICL onto exclusion law, noting that exclusion is blind to ICL's mitigation processes; Ogg argued that ICL itself masks the-particularly gendered-concerns of the persecuted. The presumption surrounding membership of notoriously violent groups underscored exclusion's failings here. The presumption appears neat, but in fact ignores that the brutality of an organisation may go some way to abrogating the voluntariness of the joining process. By failing to distinguish between and among terrorist groups, it disregards the moral dilemmas each refugee 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 faces. It is an unforgivable side effect of the febrile post-9/11 order and an affront to the object and purpose of the exclusion clause. Liability under 1F(c) was then discussed. It was shown that the 'terrorism' as conceived in relation to the Principles and Purposes of the UN is broad and broadening, the effect of this is to render more applicants excludable under 1F(c). Yet, the explicit link between terrorism and the UN Principles has also led to definitional confusion: courts have been inconsistent in the sources used to define terrorism. Inconsistency and fragmentation do not befit the humanitarian purposes of the Convention or the narrow aims of the exclusion clause.
Singer's international principle was supported as a suitably high, uniform threshold for 1F(c), absent a universal definition of terror.
To conclude, it is worth recalling the inherent morality of Art. 1F. It was because of this that France objected to the 'disturbing moral consequences' of initial suggestions that exclusion be discretionary. Israel too objected 'on moral grounds'. 119 And it is for moral reasons that moral choice is a prerequisite for guilt under the exclusion clause: the individual is excluded because of the choices they make. Yet, while Art. 1F codified parameters, the assessments are made by individuals. Exclusion is thus imbued with the morality of the decision makers. The corollary of this, for Kaushal and Dauvergne, is the direct incorporation of Western morality and public discourse into exclusion jurisprudence; the political inscribed onto the individual. 120 The imposition of terrorism on exclusion has the potential to broaden the application of the clause beyond its narrowly drawn purposes. For policy-makers, 'terrorism' is an appealing classification that catalyses candid analysis: here is terrorism, there is exclusion. 121 But the simplicity of this analysis attests to its failure to consider each case individually. This is an injustice-to the refugee, to the standard of proof in Art. 1F, and to the object and purpose of the exclusion clause. It is essential that terrorism and asylum be disconnected. Terrorism is an emotive word that smudges and distorts the dispassionate calculus of exclusion. 122 Yet these are ambitious aims. The following part examines more grounded proposals to address the inadequacies of exclusion. This section looks to remedy the critiques raised thus far. On the basis of 1F's clear language, a revised application of ICL is the first approach. Proportionality comes second, but is rejected on the basis that it could do harm to the integrity of the Convention. The third section considers a purposive, human-rights interpretation of Art. 1F. While this undoubtedly accords with the human rights values of the Convention, we must be careful not to burden the exclusion clause with the task of leading international law. This leads in to the final part on the inherent limits of Art. 1F.
PROPOSALS AND SOLUTIONS

Revised Application of ICL.
For Bond, the most appropriate way to remedy exclusion's failings is to revise the application of ICL to the clause. Four principles should guide this reorientation. First, that Art. 1F be narrowly applied, only to those whose admittance as a refugee would undermine the Convention. Second, that it be based on ICL. Third, that it be based only on settled norms of ICL. Fourth, that it accounts for the different purposes and procedures of ICL and exclusion. 123 The first of these has been explored already. The second is premised on the fact that ICL has in fact been largely absent from substantive questions of individual responsibility in exclusion assessments. 124 This submission is itself based on Rikhof's comprehensive research, which noted that exclusion frameworks rarely consider ICL holistically or consistently, but cherry-pick from it or refer to its 'essence'. In consequence, extended liability frameworks in IRL have developed independently of ICL, despite the explicit wording of 1F(a) and despite some early attempts at congruence between the two bodies of law. 125 For both Rikhof and Bond, therefore, these approaches fail in respect of the precise wording of 1F(a). 126 Bond's third principle-that unsettled ICL norms must not inform exclusion-balances the plurality of ICL with the need for exclusion to evolve consistently in line with its developments. 127 It does so by interpreting 1F restrictively, ensuring that those 'on the contested margins of criminal liability' are not excluded and preventing the expansion of the clause beyond spheres of personal responsibility already established in ICL. 128 This is an approach echoed by Hathaway and Foster, who note that 'the applicant for protection should receive the benefit of any lack of certainty 123 Bond (n 13). 124 interpretation must not find a refugee liable under it. 132 For the same reasons, defences must be considered. Just as the uncertainty generated by an unsettled norm of ICL ought to prevent exclusion, so must the uncertainty generated by a potential defence. Where doubt surrounds the liability of a refugee-either due to an unsettled norm or because of a possible defence-there is no reason to assume the credibility of asylum would be threatened by granting protection to that individual. 133 In fact, denying that person refuge would do the real damage to the moral and practical foundations of refugee law.
Proportionality
For some authors, however, ICL remains inadequate to address the contextual factors in exclusion. Lastly, Goodwin-Gill and MacAdam's approach is noteworthy. More accurately described as 'individualised determination' than proportionality, 143 it invokes defences and wider context where evidence appears of significant persecution in the home state. Like Hathaway, they argue that 'serious reasons for considering' ought to ensure thorough scrutiny of any context that may affect the guilt of the defendant. Since such issues may well be considered under wider international law procedures (IHRL and extradition), they see no reason why a harmonised IRL would not consider those in proportionality. 144 Bond and Goodwin-Gill's proportionality assessments, it may be argued, both of which consider mitigating factors, could extend proportionality beyond 1F(b). This is because the rationale of limiting proportionality to 1F(b)the idea that certain crimes are too grave ever to be offset by persecution at home-does not apply directly when there is a third factor in the balance: the blameworthiness of the individual. If an individual's blameworthiness is minimised, then perhaps that reduced liability can be offset by domestic persecution.
Given the interaction in
Pushpanathan was right to recognise 1F(b)'s inherent proportionality. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of the categorisation of a crime as political or non-political without proportionality. But the inherent, ex ante proportionality of crime categorisation does not imply an ex post proportionality to determine overall excludability after that crime has been categorised. As held in B and D, a decision maker, having determined that a person's acts reach the seriousness threshold required for Arts. 12(2)(b) and (c) QD, cannot then be expected to undertake a fresh proportionality assessment of the seriousness of those same acts. 145 This is because exclusion is effectively strict liability: commitment or guilt of the crimes outlined in Art. 1F demands a compulsory denial of Convention protections. A proportionality assessment that takes place after culpability has been established challenges the systemic viability of the refugee regime; though humanitarian, it has the potential to admit refugees who are undeserving under internationally-recognised standardswhose admittance would drag the system into disrepute. Given the growth in complementary NR protections under instruments such as the ECHR, it would be better for the RC to proceed along 143 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 43) 180. 144 ibid 83. 145 B and D (n 38) paras 108-9. the interpretive lines of its plain meaning and not to pursue a textually questionable, ex post proportionality assessment. Wennholz' proportionality should be rejected; proportionality should be confined to the definition of 'political' for the purposes of 1F(b). If B and D was the 'death knell' for proportionality in 1F(b) and (c), 146 for the reasons above it should extend to 1F(a).
Purposivism and Feminism
There is ample authority to support the invocation of wider coercions in 1F assessments. For the UNHCR, it is the 'high degree of seriousness' of 1F crimes that dictates the inclusion of all relevant circumstances. 147 For the CJEU, confirming this high degree of seriousness, individual responsibility must be assessed considering, inter alia, 'any pressure to which [the applicant] was exposed; or other factors likely to have influenced his conduct'. 148 In the UK, Gurung highlighted 'the availability of a moral choice'. 149 Yet, for Ogg, the failure properly to apply this jurisprudence in SK and MT illustrates a more endemic problem in exclusion: that these cases invoke 'wider considerations' without simultaneously determining how such factors inform moral culpability. 150 Nor is moral culpability defined in the Convention, though the inherent morality of exclusion suggests it ought to be. 151 The impacts of this are gendered, and the good faith call to preserve the value inherent in the treaty is justification (if it were needed) to recognise these concerns and so to minimise discrimination against women. For Ogg, a purposive interpretation of Art. 1F can provide a tentative framework to address the relationship between coercion and offending. 152 While Ogg avoids a precise test to determine which abuses could negate culpability her 'broad tapestry', drawing on IRL, IHRL, and criminal law, provides pointers. Where, for example, the refugee can evidence a tangible abuse of their human rights, that may negate moral culpability in some circumstances. Drawing on contemporary IHRL, the exclusion clause thus could lead international law in providing a site, for example, where gender-based violence could form at least a partial defence. 153 Recognising these gender concerns would provide a more complete image of the circumstances surrounding excludable crimes. And, it would present decision makers with a 146 Hathaway and Foster (n 5). 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 more robust, female-oriented exclusion framework-essential as women begin to occupy more prominent roles in politics and so become more likely to be implicated in excludable acts, not only as perpetrators, but as victims. 154 This purposive approach would be a departure from criminal law frameworks, but that reflects the 'divergent theoretical underpinnings of refugee law vis à vis criminal law'. 155 Where criminal law decontextualizes the defendant-devoiding them of race, ethnicity, class or gender-refugee protection is premised on a definition requiring a well-founded fear of persecution specifically in reference to those characteristics. 156 It is beyond this article to contemplate moral choice in criminal acts. Ogg herself does not attempt to do so. Her approach instead uses examples, such as the human rights defence, that could individually abrogate moral choice, and then to incorporate those into exclusion. 157 Its human rights orientation certainly promotes the value in the Convention, but there are concerns over its legal legitimacy. In determining which international laws should assist the interpretation of Art.
1F, Rikhof follows a framework developed by the ILC. 158 Under this, he suggests, both refugee law in general and exclusion law specifically ought to be viewed as lex specialis. Both are 'special regimes' with their own objects and purposes; other areas of law can aid interpretation where a special regime does not regulate a matter within its own scope (Rule 15), but generally the specialised regime will take priority over general law (Rules 5, 14). If Rikhof is correct, then Ogg has a prima facie obligation to demonstrate Art. 1F's inadequacy on its own to address the gender concerns she raises. If she can do so, she is justified in resorting to lex generalishuman rights law in general. If she cannot, she is not, and the analysis must be confined to the unique law of Art. 1F. The crucial question, therefore, is whether Art. 1F is sufficient in itself to address Ogg's valid concerns. It is: through the reformed application of ICL that Bond, Hathaway and Foster advocate. Utilising ICL is not an affront to the ILC rules on lex specialis since 1F refers explicitly to ICL. Thus, while resorting to IHRL could provide desirable results, it is not justified so long as Art. 1F can solve the problems itself, by reference to ICL. 159 While it may be tempting to use exclusion as a site for human rights-oriented purposivism, any hopes for the exclusion clause be reined in by a recollection of its aims, purposes and limitationsespecially sovereignty, as explored in the closing part. It explicitly follows, not leads, international law 160 and so should not be burdened with 'updating' human rights or international law. This is one reason why both Hathaway and Bond advocate that exclusion should only incorporate established norms of ICL. If exclusion was permitted on tenuous, specious or shifting international law grounds, its ability to deliver consistent, just decisions would surely be undermined.
Appraisal
Three proposals were advanced in this part. On proportionality, it was noted that there are two locations for the assessment to take place: in the determination of whether a crime is 'non-political' or as a later, ex post consideration. The former is encouraged; the latter is rejected. A later, discretionary proportionality analysis runs counter to the compulsory nature of the exclusion clause and could do damage to the integrity of asylum. At any rate, B and D appears to signal the end of proportionality, at least in Europe. Proportionality is the weakest proposal. A human rights oriented, purposive approach could directly remedy the inequality in 1F, particularly around gender issues. It acknowledges the unique position of Art. 1F among at least three bodies of law and utilises that to remedy its structural defaults. And yet, it is to be treated with scepticism, based on the concept of lex specialis and the need to focus, first and foremost, on the wording of the Article. Hathaway and Bond's revised application of ICL is therefore the best option. It recognises the precise wording of the exclusion clause, calling on universal, settled principles to promote harmony and certainty. As numerous authors argue, these should be priorities in exclusion. 161 Most importantly, however, if reformed, it contains the tools properly to address the critiques that proportionality and purposivism respond to. Hathaway and Foster, for instance, point out that the twin standards of Art. 1F -'serious reasons' and 'has committed'/'has been guilty of'provide ample leeway for the balancing of persecution, blameworthiness and gravity of crime. 162 While this approach may appear at first glance a retreat from human rights, the closing part demonstrates that it is the opposite. If attempts to reform the application of ICL in exclusion fail, a legal basis will be established to revert to Ogg's arguments and the lex generalis of human rights.
10.14324/111.2052-1871.121 revisions as far as the legitimacy of states or their borders are concerned'. 167 Thus, although asylum presents an exception to sovereign border control, the refugee regime still developed in conjunction with-and supporting of-the territorial sanctity of those same borders. 168 It may be argued, therefore, in light of the humanitarian failings of surrogacy, that the Convention system ought to be revised in line with contemporary, post-Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility -the 'broader diminution in the significance of the nation-state itself in both international law and politics'. 169 Tentatively, for example, this re-examination could revert the surrogacy process; rather than viewing state protection and 'well-founded fear' sequentially, the two could be approached disjunctively. The availability of protection at home would only be relevant insofar as it relates to the refugees well-founded fear; it would not be a primary, unitary consideration. 170 For Wuerth, however, the conceptual transformation of sovereignty of the past half-century has in fact weakened, not strengthened the global enforcement of IHRL norms: institutionally, the UN has stagnated and been shown ineffective; conceptually, 'traditional' sovereignty is reviving; and doctrinally, notions such as R2P have become associated with the abuse of Western power, and even imperialism. Most broadly of all, human rights are violated daily. Rather than 'doubling down' on this failing enforcement architecture, Wuerth calls on the international community to redouble its efforts onto 'a core of sovereignty-protecting international legal norms'. 171 Such norms, if regained, could benefit international law more broadly and promote international compliance with human rights. In the context of the Refugee Convention, a treaty imbued with and cast into a statist structure, a more pragmatic approach may be to support statism, rather than diminish it.
Given that refugee law is an exception to sovereign border control, the exclusion clause is the exception to the exception. It makes sense, therefore, that states see self-interest in interpreting it as broadly as possible. Doing so is a means to reclaim control. 172 This is particularly the case nowadays, where human rights protections regularly curtail the prerogative to remove refugees, 167 173 One problem is that if, on the one hand, sovereignty is asserting control over borders, and yet, on the other hand, human rights is curtailing that sovereignty by preventing removals, states will see cause to distinguish between human rights and refugee law. 174 This is a trend identified by Gilbert in the context of terrorism, who notes that broad interpretations of exclusion, formed in the long shadow of 9/11, have not corresponded with narrower interpretation on issues such as non-refoulement from international human rights bodies. 175 To the contrary, multiple decisions have emphasised the opposite: that the fight against terrorism can undermine neither the rights of the individual nor the values such removals seek to protect. 176 The effect of this simultaneous broadening of exclusion and strengthening of NR protections has been an increase in the category of 'undesirable but unremovable'. In Cantor et al's study, the common denominator in response to this dilemma was that state measures appear akin to the Emperor's New Clothes: 'they allow the sovereign to believe that his nakedness is covered without actually doing so'. 177 They provide no long-term solutions, no alternatives, and no engagement with the concerns of the individual involved. This is directly applicable to exclusion. On the one hand, an expanded Art. 1F is a 'reclamation of control', a positive reassertion of sovereignty. On the other, and particularly given complementary rights protections for refugees, it seems puerile: a vacuous show of strength that leaves the 'undesirable' refugee in a rights-less limbo. 178 Yet that show of strength is a necessary corollary of the Convention system.
That power has to exist; state cooperation depends on it. And, as long as it mediates our statist system, so too does the Convention. The integrity and authority of refugee protection, in other words, relies on the national prerogative to exclude the undeserving.
CONCLUSION
There are pressing questions that are beyond this article to discuss. Regarding terrorism, for example, it must be emphasised that terrorist concerns are security concerns. And, though its language covers egregious crimes, Art. 1F is not concerned with securitythat is the domain of 10.14324/111.2052-1871.121
Art. 33(2). They are two 'distinct provisions serving different purposes'. 179 Where Art. 1F aims to preserve the refugee regime, Art. 33(2) concerns national security. Excluding an individual on national security grounds, therefore, misapplies Art. 1F and runs counter to the object and purpose of the Convention. The conflation of these two is lacking attention.
Nevertheless, this article has argued that the concerns brought to light by contemporary terrorism-the inadequacy of Art. 1F and ICL properly to consider coercions, the presumptions and blanket categorisations that tempt decision makers but run counter to the humanitarian nature of refugee protection, the creeping expansion of the definitions and instruments under which 'terrorists' can be excluded, and the moral imposition of Western political concerns onto victimsmust be remedied within the confines provided by the exclusion clause. That begins with good faith interpretation, upholding the value in the Convention and centralising exclusion's object and purpose: the preservation of the systemic viability of international refugee protection. It recognises the surrogate, statist and sovereign limits of the Convention, and it works within those boundaries to provide harmonised principles that will lead to universal application. These are the reasons why a revised ICL is supported as the most viable solution.
There are two counter-points to note. First, a statist approach has the potential to hinder refugeeoriented harmonisation. The EU, for example, has seen attempts at the communitarisation of refugee law dogged by border-protecting, security-oriented carve-outs by individual states. 180 It is a fine balance between statism and harmonisation, and it is conceded that a statist approach has the potential, where diplomacy fails, to diminish the latter. Second, if the essence of pluralism is a 'less positivistic, more open and more responsive concept of law,' 181 the statist approach is more monist. The primary concern with monism is that the normative, humanitarian foundations of refugee law will be left behind as regimes such as IHRL lose their influence. 182 Again, this is a legitimate concern. But, the lex specialis approach advanced in part D dictates that IHRL-lex generalis-still has influence where such influence is justified. At any rate, it is argued that a more positivist, monist Art. 1F is the best way to counter the divergence, selfinterest and moral dishonesty characterising exclusion in the era of 'terrorism'. 179 
